It may be said
that everything that is not by way of agreement [synonymy] is by coincidence of
the name [homonymy]. This has three
divisions: because either [I] the sense is one in itself, even through it
differs in another respect, or [II] it is not one, but between the two of them
there is a similarity, or [III] it is not one and there is also not a similarity
between them. [Al-Maqūlāt 10,4-7]
The derivative
[paronym] has a name to which it has some relationship, namely a relationship
to some sense, whether the sense be existent in it, like ‘eloquence’, or
[belong] to it like ‘wealth’ or be a
subject for one of its actions, like ‘sharp’.
So it is intended to signify the existence of its relationship through
an expression signifying the expression [belonging] to that first sense. (This) is not the same as signifying a difference
in the sense of the relationship for the sense of what has a relationship to
it, when it is not disparate from it in any mode. So it is not suitable for
being gestured at. [1] The difference
between the two expressions is in the vowelization [šakl], while the inflection
is a difference signifying, by linguistic convention in grammar, the attachment
between the two of them. So it is said:
‘eloquent’ or ‘wealthy’ or ‘sharpener’.
Or, [2] in it something signifying the relationship is added and then it
is said: ‘grammatical’ and ‘Koreishite’.
Or, [3] by it another act is done that the conventions of one language
and not (those of) another language require.
It is a circumstance of this expression in the second [case] that it is
said about it that it is derived from the first or attributed to it, just as if
it had been taken as exactly the same.
So it is said to be transferred by resemblance, just as if he in whom
there is justice were named not “just” but were named “justice” too. This is not of the class that they call
derivative [paronymous] and attributed.
Rather, [this is] of the class that is said by similarity of the name
and its coincidence [ambiguity and homonymy] and is transferred from the first
to the second [but] not derivatively [paronymously].
The derivative [paronymous]
needs a name of the subject to have a sense, and (needs) something else having
an attribution to that sense, and (needs) the participation [homonymy] for the
name of this other (thing) with the name of the first (one) and (needs) some
alteration attached to it.
As for the distinction made
between the derivative [paronymous] and the attributive, it makes the
attributive what is signified by the attachment of the expression of the
attribution to the expression of the thing, like ‘the Hindī’ [‘Indian
(sword)’]. It makes the derivative what
is signified through an alteration attached to an expression like ‘muhannad ’ [‘made of Indian
(steel)’]. The Greeks have another
convention in these two matters. [Al-Maqūlāt 16,18-17,14]
They do not avoid
the stupidity of the Arabs and Persians also in saying: you see him in a
pleasant place [good circumstances], or on the bed. Examples of this are (such) that in their
opinion these states are qualities of the states of people. [Al-Maqūlāt
167,15-7]
I say, first,
that an examination of the theory might make necessary abandoning what is
widely accepted [endoxic]. When your
hearing that gives you reservations, suppose it good, and don’t be worried by
receiving new, unaccustomed [doctrine]. Know that the intelligent (person) does
not deviate from what is widely accepted when it is avoidable. Moreover, know
that the characteristics of objects have divisions: because either [1] the essence of what is being
characterized may be fixed (in) a subsistent sense, and then the characteristic
by which it is being characterized is attached to it externally, (in) an
inseparable or an accidental attachment, or
[2] what is being characterized has been taken insofar as its essence has been
fixed. However (here) the characteristic by which it is being characterized is
not attached to it (in) an attachment of an external object. Rather, it is part of its subsistence. Or [3] it has been taken insofar as its
essence has not been fixed later, while the characteristic is attached to it so
as to fix its essence, while it is not part of its essence, or [4] it has been taken insofar as its
essence has not been fixed later, while the characteristic is not attached to
it externally. Rather, it is part of its
existence; or [5] its essence has not
been fixed, while the characteristic is attached [to it] not due to the very
essence [per se]. Rather, what fixes it or is accidental to it first has a necessary attachment. [Al-Maqūlāt
18,4-13]
Besides that,
part of the widely accepted replies to these [questions] concedes that these
things are external to the ten [categories], while they do not talk affectedly
of a species other than [what is given in] the reply. In particular, some of them are analogous to
principles, like unity and point and prime matter and form. So they maintain that the principles are not
included in something from the categories.
That is because these principles are principles of the categories. If the principles of the categories were
included in the categories, then they would be principles for themselves. One group of (these commentators) does not
concede the externality of principles from the categories. Rather, it puts the principle and what has
the principle into a single category, and says: the unity of a totality is the quantum, and the one is in number, and
number is a quantum, and likewise the
point is in the line, and the line is a quantum. Likewise they say about privations that they
are in the categories of their [the correlated] possessions, like blindness in quale, and rest in the category of “is
acted upon” [passion], if motion is in the category of “is acted upon”. (One) band of dissenters give[s] an elaboration,
and make[s] many categories for a single thing.
They say, for instance, that a point, insofar as it is an extremity of a
line, is a relatum, and, insofar as
it is some shape, is a quale, and
that the north, insofar as it is a body, is a substance, and, insofar as it is
moving, is in the category of “is acted upon”, and, insofar as it pertains to
one of the two poles, is a “where” [place]; and having breakfast, insofar as it
is a movement, is in the category of “acts” [action], and, insofar as it belongs
to the one eating, is a relatum, and,
insofar as it is at a specific time, is in the category of ‘when” [time]. [Al-Maqūlāt
71,15-72,10]
One thing bearing
on the investigation that we are about has remained, [namely,] the
consideration of the correctness of the number of the categories and [whether,]
if their restriction into a smaller number is not possible, their ampliation
into a larger number is not possible.
This is something that a great number of logicians have attempted. I do not see any truth (in their)
treatment(s). The way to correct that
arises relative to three modes of contemplation: [1] one of them is that it is
explained that nothing is of these categories unless it is said of what is
below [them in] a statement of the genus, and this needs there to be explained
that its predication of what is under them [sc., the categories] is not by way
of a coincidence in name [homonymy]. Nor is it by way of the predication of a
single sense differing in priority and posteriority, and so it is by way of
equivocation. Nor also (is it) by way of
a statement of the inseparable [attributes] that are said of what is under them
equally, without any difference.
However, it [such a thing] is not of the categories, but rather is of
the inseparables or relational objects by which the quiddity of a thing is not
constituted. When they explain that the
predication of a category of what they make its species is a predication in a
single sense constitutive for the quiddity of those species, and is not by way
of one of the excluded modes, (then) every one of them would be a genus in
reality for what is made its species, and the relationship of one of them to
what is made its species is not a relationship of an accident to the
relationship or a relationship of the existent to the ten [categories], or a
relationship of the relationship to a number of them, like the “where” [place]
and “when” [time] and “wearing” [having] and action and passion. So, if it is
the quality for instance, it would not occur to things being made its species
according to the conditions of the occurrence of the genus, and yet it would
have occurred to them by way of inseparable [attributes], and, if it is in a
single sense, it [quality] would not be a genus for what is under it. Rather, if the predication of what is under
it of what is more specific than what is under it is a constitutive
predication, everything that is under it in reality would itself come to be the
highest genus, and, for instance, their first genus would be what is called a passive
quality and passions, while, for instance, the other genus would be the traits
and the states, and then the quality would be said of these, not by way of a
statement of the genus, but by way of [a statement of] the inseparable
[attributes, sc. the propria], [and
so] the number of the genera that are in reality highest genera would be above
the number mentioned [sc., more than ten].
This mode of minute contemplation is something with which one of the
preceding [commentators?] was not concerned. [Al-Maqūlāt 82,4-83,3]
Singular
substances are not first in the reality of substantiality even if they are
primary. There is a distinction between
the first and the primary. Not
everything that is primary to something is before [prior to] it. Rather, it may
be primary to it when there are attachments of the thing, where its perfections
[belong] to it more than to something else, or as prior to it in existence more
than to something else. The particulars
are not first in the reality of substantiality, since that reality [belongs] to
the quiddity having it and does not differ in it from something else. [Al-Maqūlāt
96,1-4]
So we say: the
confirmation of these things is not that with which the logician is
charged. Rather, it is necessary for the
logician to accept what we say, where its explanation for him is in the other
arts. We say: it is necessary to know
that every body is finite. However, the
definition of body, insofar as it is body, is not the definition of ‘body’ and
‘finite’, insofar as it is finite. The
finite is inseparable from every body after the definition of corporeity has
constituted body. Because of that, body
may be thought a body while its finitude is not being thought, so long as it is
not elucidated by a demonstrations elucidating the accidents sought for the
subjects. So finitude is not included in
the quiddity of body. Surface is not
part of the definition of body.
Nevertheless, even though every
body is finite, the dimensions are not necessary (in) their incidence in the
body in actuality. The sphere, insofar
as it is a sphere, is a body, and it [body] is not encompassed by it except in
a single limit, while there are not determined in it dimensions distinct in
actuality. Rather, body is body because
it has its situation and its natural disposition insofar as it is possible for
there to be determined in it three dimensions absolutely that intersect at a
single limit sharing an intersection at right angles. This is the form of corporeity.
The thing about which it is
possible for you to determine a dimension, and then another dimension
intersecting it at a right angle, and then a third intersecting the first two
at the first intersection at right angles, is the body. Thus, when two bodies differ through one of
them receiving one of the dimensions or two of them or three of them as smaller
or bigger than the dimensions that are in the other body, then it does not
differ from it at all in receiving three dimensions absolutely, while it does
differ from it in what it receives of the dimensions according to what has been
mentioned. Insofar as it receives three dimensions of body absolutely, and
insofar as it receives the same three dimensions, or the three that are
existent in it in actuality, if it is possible, then it is [so] insofar as it
is measured and has that insofar as it is measured, whether the measurement has
not been made determinate for it at all, if it is possible, or has been made
determinate for it. The corporeal form that is its substantial form is that in
which one body is not added to (another) body.
So it is of the class of the first division, and is the form of a
substance. Rather, it is a substance
and0 not an accident. (The thing) that is determined as appearing to the
measurement in three dimensions, (in) a measurement (that is) limited or unlimited,
is the accident that is in the quantum
type. [Al-Maqūlāt 113,1-114,5]
The relatum is a similar case. The name of the relatum is said, in (its) primary imposition, in philosophy
according to the sense given above, namely, it is that whose quiddity is said
of the characteristic mentioned above without considering whether it has, or
does not have, an existence different from that, so that, when the thing is a
substance or a quality, (and) then a relationship is attached to it, and it is
considered in respect of its relationship, then, insofar as it is like that,
there is (something) said of the quiddity in comparison to something else. Then it is a relatum, while having a specific quiddity that is not said in
comparison. When the thing is like
paternity and filiation, and its quiddity is said in comparison to something
else, even though it does not have another existence and another quiddity, then
it is also a relatum, and then the relatum has occurred to the two senses
together (in) an occurrence defining it, even if they both together do not have
a genus. So not everything that is
predicated in the sense of two categories, or of two things from two
categories, or of two things from a single category, is a genus for the two
categories. You have learned and verified
this. When it is like that, then the
sense of the relatum taken in the
definition is this common sense, while the sense of the relatum being defined is this specific sense. So [it is] just as, when the real possible is
defined, the one defining it says: the real possible is that which is possible
to be and possible not to be, his statement is not disordered in the respect
that the thing is taken in the explanation of itself, because he is not
bringing in the possible taken in the definition except (in) the generic sense
that is in the sense of the not-impossible.
Because of that, when he says: the real relatum which he is defining according to its being one of the ten
[categories] is that whose quiddity and existence is (such) as to be a relatum, and he means that it is that
whose quiddity and existence are (such) that it is (something) said of the
quiddity in comparison, while that it does not have an existence different from
that, [then] he has not taken (the thing to be) defined [the definiendum] in its definition, or the
(thing to be) described [the discribendum]
in its description. So this is of the
class of propria that specify an
attachment of the condition of experience to its common nature. When the nature of the genus, insofar as it
is the nature of the genus, is fitting, because a sense is attached and because
(it) [another one?] is not attached, where one of the two is not necessary for
it, and when there is attached to it a condition of the existence of that
sense, then it will have been specified.
When the condition of the non-existence of that sense is attached to it,
it will have been specified.
I do not mean by ‘genus’ and
‘species’ here the real genus and species, but rather the specific and the
common (ones). When the definition of
the relatum that is the category is
this one, then the head is not a relatum
in the sense [belonging] to the category, since its existence is not that it is
a relatum only. Rather, this sense has had another existence
attached to it. Likewise knowledge is a form and a quality fixed in the soul,
but still has inseparable from it some relation, and has a specific existence
insofar as it is a form [belonging] to the soul. Likewise the double is a form in the soul as a
number or as a quantum, while a relationship
happens to it. [Al-Maqūlāt 158,5-159,11]
So let us now
make a division according to the mode according to which it is appropriate to
understand the technical usage that is in the Categories, where this is
not the technical usage in the sciences.
He who has taken it upon himself to combine the two cases has tormented
himself. As for the division that is in the Categories, it violates this
precept: A [mutual] opposite is (such) that either its quiddity is said in
comparison to that to which it is opposite, or it is not. If its quiddity is said in comparison to
something else, then it is an opposition of a relatum, like paternity and filiation. As for its being a [mutual] opposition,
because paternity and filiation and the like no doubt participate in a subject,
be it a common (one) like humanity, rather, like substantiality, rather like
existence or something else, or a specific one like this man being on the right
of Zayd and then coming to be on his left.
As for its being with [mutual] opposition, as something said of the
quiddity in comparison, (it is) a case about which there is no doubt. As for that whose quiddity is not said in
comparison to something else, either the subject is suitable for a transfer
from the same extreme to the other without conversion, or it is not like that,
but rather is suitable for the transfer from each of them to the other, or from
neither of them to the other, because one of them is inseparable from it [the
subject?]. So the first division is
called the [mutual] opposition of privation and possession. And we mean by possession not like [acts of]
seeing in actuality, nor like the first potentiality, which has potentiality
according to its having sight, but rather the possession (such) that it is a
power for [acts of] seeing, whenever its holder wants it existent. So the deprivation of the first potentiality
is not through blindness, nor is the deprivation of [acts of] seeing in
actuality. Rather, the [acts of] seeing
are in actuality, and [are such] that he does not see in actuality but in
potency [with] both objects following successively in the subject (in) a
succession of motion and rest. Still,
that is a deprivation that we call a possession. So, at that time, it is not
possible to see at all. Rather,
blindness does not return the subject with it to [acts of] seeing at another
time. So the ‘non-existence’ that is
here is not the ‘non-existence’ that is opposed to any existent sense you like,
but rather the one opposed to possession. So ’non-existence’ is said in
[different] modes. And we do not seek to
enumerate them all now, but [only] what interests us about this subject. So (we) say:
[Al-Maqūlāt 245,5-246,3]
A parting instance:
This ‘prior’ is like the existence of man in
himself, and making the statement of the speaker, that he is existent, true.[1] So, whenever the statement that he is
existent is true, then he is existent, and, whenever he is existent, then the
statement of that is true. Yet men do
not avoid saying: he is existent at first, and then the statement of his
existence is true, or, so long as he is, after that the statement that he is
existent is true—while they do avoid saying that the statement of his existence
is true at first, (and) then he is existent, or, so long as it is, he is
existent. [Al-Maqūlāt
268,15-269,3]
“Avicenna
and Averroes: The Islamic Background,” in Individuation in Scholasticism,
ed. J. Gracia. SUNY Press, 1994.
“Avicenna’s
Ontological Pentagon,” The Journal of Neoplatonic Studies, Vol. VII.2
(1999).
“Avicenna
and Descartes on the Wax Example,” Proceedings of the S.I.E.P.M. Conference,
ed. S. Brown, Brepols, 1996.
“Avicenna
on Relations and the Bradleyan Regress,” in La tradition médiévale des
Catégoires, ed. J. Biard & I. Rosier-Catach (
“Avicenna on the Homonymy of Homonymy,”
[forthcoming].
“Ibn
Sina on the Individuation of Perceptible Substance,” Proceedings of the PMR
Conference, Vol. 14 (1989).
Translation of Ibn Sn, Al-Maqlt,
ed. El-Khodeiri et al. (
[1] I.e., “when I say “I am, I exist” it is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind.” !